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5. 
INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY AND 
THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
Clark Wolf 
I. FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Calls to regulate or restrict scientific research are often a matter of politics, and public desire to regulate science may have its 
source in several different underlying interests: on one side, people 
may be motivated by an interest to control risks, prevent harms, or 
limit access to powerful or dangerous technologies. These interests 
are easy to understand, and often provide entirely appropriate and 
creditable grounds for regulation. In a darker vein, people may be 
motivated by more general mistrust of science, or by moral or reli-
gious disapproval of some kinds of research. While these motives 
may be easy to understand, clearly they should be resisted. But if 
researchers hope to avoid inappropriate regulations, we need to be 
prepared to explain our research to the public. And when research is 
funded by tax dollars, it is especially important that scientists should 
be able to justify its benefit to taxpayers and legislators. 
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Regulation of science can either promote· or inhibit research. 
Either way, things can go well or badly. When Galileo's great work 
on celestial mechanics was suppressed because his results were 
inconsistent with the teachings of the church, we recognize this as 
censorship. And we recognize as similarly bogus Trophim Lysenko's 
receipt of the Stalin Prize for his ideologically informed and bogus 
"research" on agronomy and crop genetics. Contemporary US policy 
also promotes and inhibits research in select areas: special incentives 
are available for scientists whose work promotes "clean energy" 
(itself a questionable term that gets its meaning from nonscientific 
legislative fiat), and there are disincentives for research on human 
embryonic stem cell lines. Here as in other cases, regulation limits 
research and inquiry. Since freedom of inquiry and freedom of intel-
lect are among the most precious liberties we possess, it is relevant 
to try to specify the circumstances (if any) in which these liberties 
can appropriately be constrained a!ld identify very clearly the inter-
ests (if any) that justify such constraint. Those who are engaged in 
scientific research often regard public scrutiny and regulation as an 
unwarrantable intrusion and as the inappropriate incursion of polit-
i~al interests where they do not belong. A theory of regulation 
should explain when this attitude is justified and when it is not. 
In science, we can have some confidence that the truth will even-
tually rise to the top, even when science is regulated and inquiry is 
curtailed. Today we celebrate Galileo's brilliance and vision and con-
demn Lysenko as a pseudoscientific fraud. But our confidence about 
these judgments should not engender a complacent attitude toward 
regulation. Some contemporary examples of the political regulation 
of science are quite as contentious as those of Galileo and Lysenko: 
In the United States, politics have entered the research process in a 
variety of different ways, specifying which kinds of research may be 
done with public funds and at public universities (example: stem 
cell research), how research is communicated (example: global cli-
mate change research), and how new technological developments 
are made available (example: RU-486, the "abortion" drug). This 
paper begins with questions that should be taken seriously by 
anyone engaged in scientific research: 
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What business do nonscientists have to regulate science? 
What legitimate interest (if any) do legislators and the public have to 
restrict and regulate the professional activities of scientists engaged in 
research? 
These questions are especially pressing, since laypeople and law-
makers typically do not understand the science they hope to regulate. 
Consequently, their regulations may often be badly framed and 
poorly conceived. This lack of understanding, however, is not just the 
unfortunate result of ignorance or inadequate science education. 
Most cutting-edge research is complicated and specialized: even sci-
entists working in the same field often have difficulty understanding 
the work of researchers in an adjacent laboratory. It is inevitable that 
regulations governing scientific research will be framed and approved 
by people who do not fully understand the research in question. 
Such regulations do limit the liberty of scientists and their ability to 
pursue their goals, and they have a decisive influence on which 
research will be undertaken and how it will be pursued. 
In some cases, such regulation constitutes "political science" in 
the worst possible sense: if the interests that guide regulations are 
inappropriate or ideological, the result can be science that is inap-
propriately influenced by political or other interests. Just as "scien-
tists" working for the US tobacco companies produced "research" to 
undermine evidence that smoking causes cancer, there have been 
more recent events in which political interests inappropriately influ-
enced climate research. 
Many observers regarded the Bush administration's efforts to 
regulate human embryonic stem cell research as a clear case of inap-
propriate incursion of political ideology into the research process. 
Barack Obama later issued an executive order (Executive Order No. 
13,505, Fed. Reg. 10,667, March 9, 2009) in which he attempted to 
remove the barriers that prevented federal funding for this research, 
but his order was challenged in court and subsequently ruled to be 
illegal. In a controversial ruling, Chief Justice Royce Lambeth, of the 
US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in August 2010 
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An Editor In the White House 
Handwritten revisions and comment11 by Philip A. Cooney, ehhtf of stall for lhe White Hour>t Council on 
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Figure 11 
that Obama's executive order violates the Dickey-Wicker Amend-
ment of the appropriations bill for Health and Human Services (US 
District Court for the District of Columbia, Civ. No. 1:09-cv-1575 
[RCL], August 23, 2010). This amendment prohibits thefederal use 
of funds for "(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for 
research purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo or 
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of 
injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in 
utero" under other applicable federal regulations. While some hailed 
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this decision as an appropriate interpretation of the law and as 
enforcing needed protections for fetal life, others regarded it as an 
inappropriate judgment in which Judge Lambeth allowed his private 
moral convictions to influence his legal judgment. 
While we will consider the case of stem cell research later, we 
must recognize in general that regulatory restrictions do limit and 
frame research, and as such they limit the liberty of scientists. Such 
limitations can undermine ·the ability to pursue responsible 
research. Because of this, it is crucial to consider and evaluate the 
public reasons for such regulations. 
II. THE CASE FOR SCIENTIFIC LIBERTY 
It is easy to sketch the case in favor of the liberty to pursue scientific 
research without undue impediments: In part, the freedom to 
pursue scientific research is simply one aspect of the more general 
liberty we enjoy, or should enjoy as participants in a free society. But 
beyond this, freedoms of intellect and thought are special freedoms, 
regarded as fundamental in US constitutional law, and by many 
political theorists. 2 StilL while freedom in the practice of scientific 
research is closely related to intellectual liberty, it may be somewhat 
broader in scope: scientific practice is not typically expressive activity, 
and the liberty to pursue empirical research is distinct from, though 
perhaps no less important than, the liberty to believe what one's 
intellect and conscience may dictate. These principles of liberty of 
action, intellect, and conscience are very general considerations, and 
they apply not only to scientific research but also to all our actions 
and pursuits. 
Beyond these very general considerations, there are special rea-
sons why we might hope to give special protections to scientific 
enquiry: scientific advance and innovation are important public 
goods, and we have a strong public interest to promote them. 3 In the 
modem world, scientific advancements and the infrastructure neces-
sary to generate them are important sources of culture, resources, 
and social wealth. To produce these benefits, scientists need 
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resources, infrastructure, support, and liberty. The wealth and wel-
fare of nations that are unable or unwilling to provide these neces-
sities will be very seriously at risk as information and technology 
become increasingly important to global economy and culture. 
But the notion that scientific knowledge is a public good is some-
times called into question. In the modem world, the most economi-
cally significant advances in scientific knowledge are usually private 
intellectual property. Privately owned and controlled knowledge 
might be thought to benefit its owners, not the general public. In 
response to this concern, it's worth noting that the aim of intellectual 
property law is itself to promote the public good: Intellectual prop-
erty protections, in fact, are among 'the ways in which scientific 
knowledge is regulated, since regulations can be designed either to 
promote what is regarded as desirable or prevent what is regarded as 
dangerous or undesirable. But intellectual property rights are (sup-
posed to be) designed to promote the public good by providing an 
incentive for innovation and research. This is specified in Article 1 
Section 8 of the US Constitution, which grants Congress the power 
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries." The purpose of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) law is to "promote progress of science and useful arts" by 
providing an incentive for those who pursue them. This underlying 
aim provides a standard· that can be used to evaluate existing laws: 
where IP laws stifle or constrain innovation, they fail to serve the pur-
pose for which they were enacted. But the Constitution only protects 
intellectual property rights that "promote the useful arts," and the 
constitutional reasons for patent legislation are framed to promote 
the public good. It is noteworthy that the Constitution permits the 
creation of patents but does not require it. The framers evidently 
viewed patent law, and intellectual property law more generally, to be 
justified by the public benefits they provide and not by any view that 
.. 
inventors and researchers have an independent nonlegal right to con-
trol the intellectual goods they produce. Where private intellectual 
property rights don't serve this objective, they raise both constitu-
tional and legal concerns. As I will argue, this provides very good 
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reason why scientists who use the US patent laws should feel (and 
fulfill) an obligation to ensure that their work really does have net 
public benefits. Scientists should also be prepared to explain these 
benefits to the public that pays a substantial portion of the research 
costs that produced, and which is supposed to benefit from, the insti-
tutions that create and enforce inventors' rights. 
III. POLITICAL AUTHORITY, REGULATION, 
AND CONSTRAINT 
·Given the general right to liberty and the instrumental value of sci-
entific advance, what considerations justify regulation? In US law it 
is the constraint of libe~ not its exercise, that requires justification. 
That is, in the absence of a sufficient and compelling reason in favor 
of constraint or regulation, people are understood to have a right to 
do as they please. This thought is sometimes called the ''presump-
tion in favor ofliberty."4 Under this presumption, if Alph wishes to 
engage in some behavior but Beth wishes either to prevent him from 
doing so, or to regulate him as he does so, the burden lies on Beth 
to show that there is a good and sufficient reason that justifies the 
limitation of Alph's liberty. 
Should we accept this presumption in favor of liberty? In one 
sense, this presumption simply embodies what it means to live in a 
free society. Liberty is an important good, and the right to liberty is 
a fundamental value. United States legislatures and courts have rec-
ognized such a presumption in a variety of different contexts: The 
Ninth Amendment of the US Constitution specifies, "The enumera-
tion in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people." Discussion sur-
rounding the enactment of this amendment shows that the framers 
regarded it as necessary to insure that later legislators and courts 
would not assume that people don't possess a right simply because 
it is not specified in the Constitution. 5 The Constitution ceded a 
limited set of rights to the government, which then was understood 
to have only those powers that were expressly given. 
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In another context, John Stuart Mill articulated a powerful 
defense of individual liberty and the limits of regulatory legislation. 6 
Mill famously writes: 
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfu.lly be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remon-
strating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him', or 
entreating him, but not for compelling him of visiting him with 
any evil in case he do otherwise .... Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 
The principle that limitations on liberty are permissible only 
when they aim to prevent harm to others is usually called the Harm 
Principle. Mill intended this principle, for which he provides a 
detailed defense, to provide a complete theory about the rightful 
limits of the coercive power of the state. Mill's view is plausible and 
has been defended by many contemporary theorists. 7 Applied to the 
context of scientific investigation and the public regulation of sci-
ence, this view would imply that the only reason that can justify the 
regulation of scientific activity is the imposition of harm or risk of 
harm on others. Thus, on this view restrictions that specify the treat-
ment of research subjects would qualify as legitimate, as would 
restrictions that regulate risky research that imposes risks on non-
participants. If this were the sole justification for the restriction and 
regulation of scientific research, then many such regulations would 
be unjustified and unjustifiable. 
IV. REASONS FOR REGULATION 
It is useful to consider reasons that have actually been cited to jus-
tify the regulation of scientific research. This section will consider 
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reasons based on the "Faustian Myth" (if myth it is) that science 
must be regulated to prevent scientists from "going too far," and the 
notion that research may be regulated when people regard the 
methods or intended result to be "immoral." 
(i) Regulation to Prevent Scientists from 
"Going Too Far": Faust and Forbidden Fruit 
One motive to regulate science may be found in public mistrust of 
scientists and public concerns about research or technology "going 
too far." This concern has found its expression in literary works: In 
Goethe's Faust, a researcher sells his soul to the devil in his effort to 
gain knowledge and mastery over nature. In Mary Shelly's Franken-
stein, science gone awry literally produces a monster. Timothy Ferris 
has dubbed this notion that "science must be reined in lest it go to 
far" the "Faust Myth. "8 This myth, if a myth it is, stretches back to 
some of our oldest stories-to Adam and Eve and the forbidden tree 
of knowledge, and to the earlier stories that have been identified as 
progenitors of that story from Genesis. In one of its most appealing 
representations, this view appears in John Milton's epic poem Para-
dise Lost.9 In an early section of Milton's poem, Adam and Eve are 
amazed to find themselves in the Garden of Eden. They ask for 
information about their circumstances and their origin, and the 
angel Raphael responds: 
I have received, to answer thy desire 
Of knowledge within bounds; beyond abstain 
To ask, nor let thine own inventions hope 
Things not revealed, which the invisible King, 
Onely Omniscient, hath suppresed in Night, 
To none communicable in Earth or Heaven: 
Enough is left besides to search and know. 10 
Raphael makes it clear that they will receive only as much 
knowledge as fits their limited capabilities, and that there are other 
realms of knowledge that have been reserved for God alone. But 
Raphael explains his reasons for this constraint: 
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Knowledge is as food, and needs no less 
Her Temperance over Appetite, to know 
In measure what the mind may well contain, 
Oppresses else with Surfeit, and soon turns 
Wisdom into Folly, as Nourishment to Wind. 11 
Explaining these lines, Wendell Berry writes: "Raphael is saying, with 
angelic circumlocution, that knowledge without wisdom, limitless 
knowledge, is not worth a fart; he is not a humorless archangel. "12 
The view that scientists "should not go too far" has contempo-
rary defenders. Echoes of the view can be found in the works of 
some authors I admire very much, including Wendell Berry and Bill 
McKibben. 13 But as the underlying source of this concern, in many 
cases, these writers are animated by their sense that science has pro-
vided technical mastery that threatens harm. Thus McKibben is con-
cerned that new technologies will harm people and the environ-
ment, and Berry is concerned to argue that economic "knowledge" 
of the workings of free markets is dangerous because, as he argues, 
it's essentially false and leads us to bad policy, not because it reflects 
an intemperate pursuit of essentially forbidden knowledge. Perhaps, 
in the face of motives to regulate scientific research to prevent scien-
tists from "going too far" we should simply maintain our commit-
ment to liberty and permit regulation only tb prevent harm and risk 
of harm to others. It would clearly violate the presumption in favor 
of liberty and Mill's harm principle to constrain or regulate scientific 
research in order to prevent scientists from discovering knowledge 
that some may regard as hidden or forbidden. 
(ii) Public Reasons and Regulation 
to Prevent "Immoral Science" 
In other contexts, regulation seems to be based on a desire to prevent 
the pursuit of scientific projects that are regarded as "immoral." For 
example, efforts to regulate the development and distribution of RU-
486, the so-called abortion pill, were pursued by people who regarded 
the use of this drug to be immoral. Efforts to prevent and constrain 
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research involving fetal stem cells also seems to have been pursued by 
people who regarded this research to be immoral and believed that the 
method used to obtain these cells was similarly immoral. 
The belief that stem cell research is immoral is controversial and 
debatable. Polls consistently showed that a strong majority of Amer-
icans did not agree with this judgment, and regarded this research as 
important and promising. Nonetheless restrictions on this research 
were imposed by a presidential order restricting the set of cell lines 
that could be used in publicly funded research and forbidding the 
use of public funds for research involving any other lines. Because 
the available lines were few, and because they had been contami-
nated with mouse DNA during the process used to "immortalize" 
them, these restrictions did, at least temporarily, tightly constrain 
research on human stem cells. 
Critics of the Bush administration decision to restrict stem cell 
research argued that Bush was imposing a parochial moral and reli-
gious agenda on others whose convictions were different. A New 
York Times editorial made this case: 
Mr. Bush is adamantly opposed to such research, which involves 
creating microscopic embryos to derive stem cells that genetically 
match a diseased patient, thus facilitating research on particular 
diseases and ultimately potential cures. There, too, he seeks to 
impose his morality on a society with pluralistic views. 14 
The implicit argument of this passage is that public policy had 
wrongly been motivated by private moral reasons that were not 
widely shared. In this case, the reasons in question were the presi-
dent's private religious convictions, which included the conviction 
that life begins at conception and that fetal life should be protected 
as sacred. The Times urged that it is wrong for the president to appeal 
to his private moral or religious convictions when enacting public 
regulations. 
The foil to this view, not logically implied but indicated by this 
writer, is that it would be more proper to permit regulation only 
when it could be supported by public reasons.15 Where public rea-
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sons for regulation cannot be found, people should be left free to do 
as they wish, without any regulatory impediments. But which rea-
sons are public? 
A theory of public reasons is a theory of which reasons justify 
public action or public regulation. A commitment to public reason 
involves recognition that public actions must be explained and jus-
tified to the people to whom they apply. John Rawls expresses this 
view as a condition for the proper exercise of power of the govern-
ment over individuals. He writes, "Our exercise of political power is 
proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance 
with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reason-
ably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals accept-
able to them as reasonable and rational. "16 Since regulation involves 
an exercise of power, we should consider the implications of this 
strong view for the problem under consideration here. Rawls's 
requirement for public reason is strong: others should be reasonably 
expected to endorse the underlying principles that justify the exercise 
of power. They need not agree with the specific exercise of state 
power in question, but the exercise of power will be unjustified, on 
this view, if they could not be expected to accept the underlying 
prinCiple that justifies the use of power. Rawls's view implies recog-
nition that the justification of coercive power is justification to fellow 
members of our political community on whom this power may be exer-
cised, and must be based on principles that they would accept. 17 
In a similar and closely related sense, public reasons may be dis-
tinguished from "merely" private reasons that apply to us as individ-
uals, or to members of our smaller private communities. Religious 
reasons, for example, are "private" in the sense that they apply 
among fellow believers but would not provide justification for 
broader public policy. Indeed, religious reasons are sometimes taken 
as a paradigm case of private reasons that may justify individual 
action and choice but cannot rightly justify restrictions on the lib-
erty or choices of other people who do not share the same convic-
tions. By contrast, the paradigm examples of reasons that are public 
are ( 1) constitutional reasons, and ( 2) reasons that justify regulation 
or law by reference to our right to protect others from harm. 
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Perhaps we should provisionally accept the view that scientific 
research may appropriately be regulated only when the reasons for 
regulation are based on public, not merely private reasons. On this 
view, wherever restriction or regulation of science cannot be justified 
by reference to public reasons, it is illegitimate and unjustified. 
(iii) Public Skepticism about Science 
Another motivation for the regulation of science is public skepti-
cism. In the United States, many people are skeptical of scientific 
results and theories. A significant number of Americans, for 
example, do not believe the theory of evolution. Many deny the view 
embodied in the broad consensus among climate scientists, 
showing the connections between global climate change and 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. In both cases, skeptics 
have made a concerted effort to influence the way science is taught, 
pursued, funded, and reported.18 
V. THE LIBERTY TO PURSUE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
The discussion above has identified three principal considerations 
that militate strongly in favor of the liberty to pursue scientific 
research without impediment. It will be useful to state each of these 
considerations clearly: 
1) Presumption in favor of liberty: The liberty to pursue scien-
tific research is simply one aspect of a more general right 
against interference from others, at least where our behavior 
does not threaten harm or risk of harm to others. 
2) Freedom of conscience and expression: The liberty to pursue 
scientific research is implicit in broader protections for other 
intellectual liberties, including freedom of conscience and 
free expression. 
3) Public reasons requirement: Restrictions on research are only 
appropriate when they can be supported by public reasons. If 
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regulations are based only on private reasons (the religious 
or moral convictions of the legislator, for example) they con-
stitute an unacceptable limitation of liberty. 
If accepted, these three considerations constitute powerful reasons 
to avoid many restrictions and regulations that impede scientific 
research. 
VI. PUBLIC FUNDING AND REASONS 
IN FAVOR OF REGULATION 
The arguments listed above address direct regulation of research: reg-
ulations that unconditionally restrict research activities, or which 
(like IP law) create a regulatory regime that provides incentives. 
Where research is publicly funded, the case for liberty is different, 
since there are liberty interests on both sides of the case. Public 
research funding is effected through taxation, and those who are 
taxed to support research have a legitimate interest in the research 
they pay for. In effect, where research is publicly funded, the case 
one needs to make in order to justify regulation is lighter than it is 
in the case of privately funded research. Consider the arguments that 
might be made by a taxpayer whose money is used to support 
research she might find questionable. 
First, such taxation involves both coercion and limitation of lib-
erty, and thus requires justification under the presumption in favor of 
liberty discussed earlier. While direct restrictive regulation of scien-
tific research would require similar justification, the argument from 
liberty would seem, in this case, to favor the rights,of taxpayers and 
not the rights of scientists and researchers. In this case, if regulations 
are necessary to ensure that research funding can answer the chal-
lenge from the presumption for liberty, this would constitute a good 
argument in favor of regulation. 
A second argument from the principle of freedom of conscience 
also provides support for the regulation of funded research: In gen-
eral, our right of freedom of conscience protects our right to believe 
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and to express whatever we wish, and is considered to be violated 
where one is forced to express a view one does not accept. 19 But 
people frequently take this value to be compromised when their tax 
dollars are used to support endeavors they do not supp-ort. Thus 
during the war in Iraq, many Americans who disapproved of the war 
regarded it to be a violation of their right of freedoJ? of conscience 
that their tax dollars were used to fund a war they did not support. 
In a similar sense, some people regard it as a violation of conscience 
that their tax money is used to support research that violates their 
moral principles. Sometimes this was articulated as an expressive 
harm: "By funding the war with my money, the government forces 
me to express support for a war I do not support." While paying one's 
taxes is · not usually considered to be a fundamentally expressive 
action, it is easy to understand the view of people who object to 
their tax money being used in this way. We might call this the "Not 
with my money!" argument. 20 
But a similar argument arises in the case of controversial 
research: For example, if federal funds are used to support human 
fetal stem cell research, taxpayers who are opposed to such research 
might feel that they are being forced to express support for activities 
they regard as deeply immoral. In this sense, the argument from 
freedom of conscience provides some significant initial support for 
the view that this research should not receive public funding. 
Whether this view is convincing all things considered will depend on 
whether an adequate response can be given to this objection. 
A third and closely related argument derives more directly from 
the requirement that coercive public policies require public reasons 
for their justification. The fact that people disagree about controver-
sial research immediately raises the concern that this expense might 
not be justifiable to them in light of "principles and ideals acceptable 
to them as reasonable and rational. "21 
Notice that these are the same values we cited earlier in defense 
of scientific liberty. It seems that the same principles and considera-
tions that support the liberty to pursue research may also provide 
justification for constraints on research that is supported by public 
funds. 
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VII. PUBLIC FUNDING, PUBLIC REGULATION, 
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES 
While the considerations cited in the previous section might be 
thought to call into question the entire institution of publicly 
funded scientific research, it would be inappropriate to conclude 
that we should eliminate such funding in an effort to protect the 
interests of the public. There is a strong public interest in pursuing 
scientific and technological progress, and without public funding 
this interest would be poorly served. It is crucial, however, to recog-
nize that the arguments in favor of regulation impose a burden of 
justification on those who allocate funds for research and those who 
receive and use them. 
Without doubt, some public funds will be used to support 
research that some people will regard as immoral or morally ques-
tionable. If univ~rsal consent and approval were necessary, then it 
would be difficult or impossible to justify the public support of any 
science at all. Since we do have good reasons to provide public sup-
port for science, we must conclude that the requirement of universal 
consent is simply excessive. But this conclusion comes at a cost that 
must be counted: in this case, the cost is borne by citizens who are 
compelled, through taxation, to provide funds for research they do 
not understand and of which they may not approve. I would argue 
that this justifies reasonable public regulation of funded research, 
and that it also imposes an important obligation on scientists whose 
research receives this funding. The obligation in question is not 
simply an obligation to do good science-it goes without saying 
that those who receive public support have an obligation to deliver 
quality. But in addition, there is an obligation to do what one can to 
ensure that the projects one pursues really do serve the public 
interest in the end and to do what one can to explain one's research 
to the public whose tax dollars make it possible. Scientists need to 
be able to explain the value of their work and to show that it really 
does merit the use of public resources. 
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IIX. CONCLUSION 
This paper began with two pointed questions: 
What business do nonscientists have to regulate science? 
What legitimate interest (if any) do legislators and the public have to 
restrict and regulate the professional activities of scientists engaged in 
research? 
When considering regulation in the abstract, it may seem that there 
are overwhelming reasons to leave scientists alone, as free as pos-
sible from regulations that might impede or constrain the process of 
inquiry. Beyond the minimal restrictions necessary to ensure the 
integrity of the research process and to protect the rights and inter-
ests of those who might be harmed or put at risk by some research, 
scientists should be free to do as they please. 
But where public funds are provided to support research, I have 
argued that researchers should hold themselves to a higher standard, 
and the case against regulation is weaker. In effect, the burden 
imposed by the presumption in favor of liberty falls on scientists, 
not on regulators. Scientists who are granted public support must, 
through their research, be able to show that the value of their work 
justifies the infringement of liberty involved in gathering public 
funds. Even so, not just any reasons will justify the regulation of sci-
entific practice. We should still avoid regulation that cannot be sup-
ported by good and sufficient public reasons. 
I have argued that the burden is on scientists to defend the value 
of their research and their claim to public funding. Since public 
funding relies on taxation, the presumption in favor of liberty 
imposes the heaviest burden of proof on scientists, not on regula-
tors. Scientists who hope to avoid inappropriate regulations had 
better be prepared to explain their work, and its value, to those who 
are compelled to support it. 
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